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1. Introduction and background
In recent years, the competitiveness of the market
for audit services has been the subject of consider-
able attention from the accounting profession, reg-
ulators and academic researchers. Among the main
issues of concern is whether Big Four auditors
command a premium when setting fees for statuto-
ry corporate audit services and, if so, whether the
premium is symptomatic of a lack of competition
in the audit market, or results from a higher quali-
ty product in competitive markets. In the UK, the
(then) Department for Trade and Industry and the
Financial Reporting Council (Oxera, 2006) esti-
mated the Big Four premium at 18%; they con-
cluded that it results from higher concentration and
while auditor reputation is important to compa-
nies, some large UK firms have no effective choice
of auditor due to significant barriers to entry.
Furthermore, since the seminal contribution of
Simunic (1980), a large number of studies, from a
variety of markets and countries, find a premium
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for
large (Big Eight, Big Six and Big Four) auditors,
for companies of various sizes (e.g. Pong and
Whittington, 1994; Seetharaman et al., 2002;
McMeeking et al., 2007; Clatworthy and Peel,
2007). A survey of the international empirical evi-
dence (Moizer, 1997: 61) reports that ‘the results
point to a top tier fee premium of between 16 to
37%’; meanwhile, in a meta-analysis of 147 pub-
lished audit fee studies, Hay et al. (2006: 176) find
that ‘the results on audit quality strongly support
the observation that the Big 8/6/5/4 is associated
with higher fees.’
Notwithstanding these findings, recent research
has turned its attention to the important issue of the
non-random selection of auditors and its impact on
observed large auditor premiums. Some studies re-
port that the premium paid to large auditors is larg-
er than implied by OLS estimates when the
Heckman model is employed to control for selec-
tion bias. In a study of UK listed companies,
Ireland and Lennox (2002: 89) conclude that ‘the
large audit fee premium is more than twice as large
when one controls for selection bias (53.4% com-
pared to 19.2%)’. Moreover, based on a sample of
UK companies over the period 1985 to 2002,
McMeeking et al. (2006) find that the large auditor
premium increases when selection bias is con-
trolled for. Not all research using the correction for
selection bias has produced the same results, how-
ever. In a recent examination of the pricing of
audit services in UK local authorities, Giroux and
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Jones (2007) report that the selection bias correc-
tion makes little difference to inferences from OLS
regressions. Furthermore, in a study of UK private
companies, Chaney et al. (2004) fail to find a large
auditor premium after they control for potential
self-selection. Using OLS regression, they find a
significant positive coefficient on a large auditor
(Big Five) binary variable, but no premium when
a two-step Heckman procedure to control for po-
tential self-selection of auditors is used. Indeed,
they conclude (2004: 67) that ‘if big 5 auditees had
chosen non-big 5 auditors, their audit fees would
have been higher.’ Similar findings were reported
by the same authors for a sample of US listed firms
(Chaney et al., 2005). These findings represent a
very important development in the literature since
they imply that many previous studies may have
erroneously reported large auditor premiums – de-
spite recent evidence (e.g. Blokdijk et al., 2006)
that the Big Four provide higher quality audits.
The purpose of this paper is to present new evi-
dence on the Big Four auditor premium and the ef-
fects of auditor selection for a large sample
(36,674) of independent private UK firms by em-
ploying two-stage estimators and new decomposi-
tion and matching methods. Although the Heckman
estimator represents an innovative correction for
selection bias, it requires a valid additional identi-
fying variable (instrument) for reliable implemen-
tation of the method; however, such variables are
often extremely difficult to obtain in practice.1
Since previous studies using the Heckman estima-
tor do not focus on this important issue, this paper
reports the sensitivity of estimates to the inclu-
sion/exclusion of such an instrument. Furthermore,
the Heckman estimator has been employed uncriti-
cally in the accounting literature to date, but analy-
ses in other social science research suggest that it is
highly sensitive to model specification, in contrast
to OLS single-stage estimates (e.g. Hartman, 1991;
Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997). This is particularly
important because the Heckman model is increas-
ingly used as a ‘robustness test’ for selection bias in
accounting research in general and in the auditing
literature in particular. If the model is not properly
identified, this may lead to Heckman results lack-
ing robustness due to severe collinearity problems
(Little and Rubin, 1987; Puhani, 2000). Our analy-
sis therefore focuses on these issues by illustrating
the effects and sensitivity of the Heckman model to
specification and sample variations and to the valid
identification of the two-stage equations. An inde-
pendent contemporaneous working paper by
Francis and Lennox (2008) also examines the sen-
sitivity of the Heckman model in estimating the
large auditor premium for UK private firms.
Although there is naturally some overlap between
the two studies (and their results are of relevance to
the current paper, so are discussed where appropri-
ate), there are some important differences. In con-
trast to the present paper, the major aim of Francis
and Lennox (2008) is to replicate the findings of
Chaney et al. (2004) for a more recent time period,
using the same models and sampling design as
Chaney et al. (2004). The present paper does not
aim to reproduce the results of Chaney et al.
(2004), since it is based on a much larger cross sec-
tional (rather than panel-based) sample of UK pri-
vate firms and our models include additional
important variables in order to obtain a more reli-
able and representative estimate of the Big Four
premium. Importantly, our analysis also involves
decomposition and matching methods not em-
ployed by Francis and Lennox (2008).
A further objective of the paper is to examine the
significant methodological issue of how to estimate
causal treatment effects in accounting and auditing
research (the appointment of a Big Four auditor in
our case) using OLS, selection and matching mod-
els. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of fee
differences between Big Four and non-Big Four
auditees using maximum likelihood (ML) and for-
mal decomposition measures for selection effects
not previously employed in the accounting and au-
diting literature. An increasingly popular approach
adopted in the applied econometrics and finance
literature involves matching procedures, particular-
ly propensity score matching methods (e.g. Black
and Smith, 2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006; Li
and Prabhala, 2007), although these have yet to be
employed in auditing research. Using these meth-
ods, we present new evidence on the large auditor
premium using closely matched samples (in respect
of size, risk and complexity) of companies audited
by Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. In summa-
ry, our paper extends extant research by identifying
potential weaknesses of the Heckman model and
presenting alternative procedures to estimate the
Big Four premium.
Our work contributes to the empirical literature
on selection bias and the Big Four premium by
using the largest sample of UK firms yet studied.
The richness of our data set and large sample size
allow us to subject this important issue to consid-
erable scrutiny.2 Our results suggest that two-step
140 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 For instance, Neumayer (2003: 655) notes ‘The problem is
that such an exclusionary variable is frequently impossible to
find’; moreover, Bryson et al. (2002: 9) state that ‘the identifi-
cation of a suitable instrument is often a significant practical
obstacle to successful implementation.’
2 At 36,674 observations, our sample is substantially larger
than the largest (6,198 observations) in the meta-analysis of
over 140 audit fee studies by Hay et al. (2006). Moreover, our
dataset includes a more comprehensive set of variables than
prior studies of selection bias and private UK company audit
fees. In particular, the model reported by Chaney et al. (2004)
excludes the number of subsidiaries and a second corporate
size variable (sales), both of which have been found important
in previous research.
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corrections for selection bias in audit fee models
are very sensitive to model specification (includ-
ing the absence of an identifying variable), and to
the sample used – findings consistent with empiri-
cal results in applications of two-step models in
other fields (e.g. Winship and Mare, 1992;
Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997; Leung and Yu,
2000). Using more consistent propensity score and
pre-processed portfolio matching approaches, we
conclude that the Big Four premium is still present
after controlling for observable audit client charac-
teristics and that models attributing the premium to
unobservable characteristics should be treated
with a high degree of caution. The Heckman pro-
cedure is becoming more widely used in account-
ing research such as studies of accruals quality
(Doyle et al., 2007) and effects of disclosure on
stock returns (Tucker, 2007). Accordingly, our re-
sults and methods are also likely to be of more
general interest to accounting and business re-
searchers. The remainder of the paper is organised
as follows. In the next section, we outline general
modelling issues and assumptions; Section 3 de-
scribes our variables and data, while our empirical
results based on single stage, two-step and match-
ing estimators follow in Section 4. The paper con-
cludes in Section 5 with a summary, implications
and suggestions for future research.
2. Modelling issues and the Big Four
premium
2.1. Evidence on the premium in prior literature
To date, the auditing literature has advanced sev-
eral non-independent reasons for large auditors
charging higher fees, including the Big Four (for-
merly Big Eight, Big Six and Big 5) being associ-
ated with established reputations, higher quality
audits, higher training costs, higher potential loss-
es in the event of shareholder litigation (‘deep
pockets’) and the occupation of a position of oli-
gopoly in many audit markets (Moizer, 1997).
Craswell et al. (1995) note that in competitive
markets, the large auditor premium represents a re-
turn to Big Four investments in brand name repu-
tation for higher quality audits. In the market for
the largest multinational companies, however,
smaller auditors, due to their lack of technical re-
sources and geographical coverage, are unable to
compete; hence such auditees are limited in choice
to Big Four auditors only. For example, the Oxera
report (2006: i) concludes there are significant bar-
riers to entry in the sub-market for large UK quot-
ed companies, ‘including the high cost of entry, a
long payback period for any potential investment,
and significant business risks when competing
against the incumbents (Big Four) in the market’.
Testing whether or not the auditee market is
competitive (i.e. amongst the Big Four) for the
largest companies, or subject to cartel pricing be-
haviour, is clearly difficult, since no realistic coun-
terfactuals exist – with, for example, Big Four
auditors accounting for 97.4% of the audits of the
FTSE 350 in 2005 (Oxera, 2006). In the current
paper we study UK private companies, where the
market is a priori competitive in that Big Four
concentration is relatively low (8.3% of audits in
our sample) and where both Big Four and non-Big
Four auditors are represented across a wide range
of auditee size. In such a market any observed pre-
mium is more likely to be related to perceived or
actual audit quality differentials than to a lack of
competition.3
In our modelling of audit fees, we therefore as-
sume a competitive market using the seminal audit
fee framework of Simunic (1980) and developed
by Pong and Whittington (1994). Simunic (1980)
hypothesises that audit fees vary in association
with audit production functions, loss exposure and
audit quality (modelled with reference to auditee
size, complexity, risk and auditor quality). Pong
and Whittington (1994) posit that supply is related
to auditors’ cost functions and hence largely asso-
ciated with the quantity of work/effort. Because of
professional and statutory prescriptions for mini-
mum audit standards, Pong and Whittington
(1994) argue that the demand for audit is relative-
ly inelastic. Furthermore, as noted by Simunic
(1980: 170), in terms of product differentiation,
the audit market is hedonic, i.e. differentiated audit
products (quality) are not directly observed and
‘the principal differentiation characteristic of the
service is likely to be the identity of the supplier …
it is the Big Eight firms which enjoy visibility and
brand name recognition among buyers.’
The UK private company audit market is an in-
teresting context in which to test for the presence
of a large auditor premium. In addition to the more
competitive nature of the supply side of the audit
market, there are economic arguments both for and
against the prediction that a Big Four premium
will be observed. As argued by Chaney et al.
(2004), lower agency costs for private firms
(which are more closely held), potentially less re-
liance on financial statements by outsiders and
lower litigation risk for auditors (compared to list-
ed firms) would point to lower demand for high
quality audit services, and hence to no expectation
of a premium. By contrast, owners of private firms
may seek to signal credibility of their financial
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 141
3 Several studies indicate that a premium may be warranted
as a result of differential audit quality. For example, Blokdijk
et al. (2006) find that the quality of audits by the (then) Big
Five is higher, even though the total effort exerted is similar to
smaller auditors. Francis et al. (1999) report that Big Six audi-
tors constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals more
than smaller auditors, while Lennox (1999) finds that large au-
ditors’ reports are more accurate than those of smaller auditors.
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statements should they plan to sell their stake and
the absence of market values may make informa-
tion provided by the financial reporting process
more important (e.g. for managerial performance
measures). Collis et al. (2004) find increased de-
mand for audit services in general (rather than be-
tween types of auditor) from firms wishing to
maintain good relationships with lenders; it is pos-
sible that such findings may extend to firms wish-
ing to appoint higher quality auditors to testify to
the truth and fairness of their financial statements.
In addition, there is evidence that newly listed
firms attract cheaper debt capital if they appoint a
large auditor (Pittman and Fortin, 2004), suggest-
ing that higher audit fees may eventually be recov-
ered through the payment of lower rates of
interest.
2.2. Statistical specifications and assumptions
In this section, we describe the models and as-
sumptions that provide the basis for our empirical
analysis. Although our focus is on the Big Four
premium, the discussion is applicable to other
areas of accounting and business research where
selection bias is a potential problem. At various
points, we refer readers to the Appendix for a more
formal exposition of the issues in this section.
OLS and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
We start by dividing companies into those with a
Big Four auditor and those without. This division
is indexed below by BIG4 and NON and represent-
ed by a dummy variable (D) taking the value of
one if the auditee appoints a Big Four auditor and
zero otherwise. The literature typically assumes
audit fees (F), expressed in natural log form (lnF),
depend on K variables (Xk k = 1,..,K) – principally
auditee size, complexity and risk measures – em-
ploying a linear regression of the form shown in
Figure 1, where the error term (ε) reflects unob-
servable random determinants of the fees paid to
auditors.
Audit fees may vary between these groups be-
cause observable characteristics (X) are different
and/or because the impact of these characteristics
on audit fees (β ≠ 0, αk ≠ βk) is different. For 
instance, as Pong and Whittington (1994) and
Chaney et al. (2004) note, it is likely that Big Four
auditors are better equipped to audit larger, more
complex clients, although such comparative ad-
vantages may be offset in part by higher fixed
costs associated with the training of audit staff.
Initially we assume for our single stage conven-
tional estimates that any unobservable auditee
characteristics are the same for D = 1 and D = 0,
so the errors have the same distribution for each
type of auditor. A problem arises since we cannot
directly compare the fees paid under each regime
because we only observe a company as a client of
either a Big Four or a non-Big Four auditor, but
not both, i.e. we do not observe the counterfactual
outcome.4 This problem can be overcome by 
assuming that the values of the regressors are
unimportant in respect of computing the counter-
factuals; however, if there are large and significant
differences in the values of the regressors for Big
Four and non-Big Four auditees, then it may be
unreasonable to extrapolate between them.5
If the OLS estimates of the parameters in (1) 
and (2) are (a, ak) for the non-Big Four auditees
and (a, b, bk) for the Big Four auditees, then the
predicted log of audit fees for a Big Four auditee,
firm i, in each audit regime are:
(the counterfactual value) and 
(the actual predicted value). The Big Four premium
142 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
Linear regression for audit fees
For Big Four clients (D = 1) (1)
For non-Big Four clients (D = 0) (2)
4 Another potential concern is the use of linear functions. It
may be possible for the same non-linear audit fee equation to
apply to both types of auditee so that any observed Big Four
premium might be entirely ‘explained’ by auditees’ different
characteristics. A premium can still be predicted if linear ap-
proximations are estimated at markedly different points on the
curve.
5 For example, at the limit, it would appear inappropriate to
compare the audit fees paid by large and small auditees if all
large auditees employed Big Four auditors while all small au-
ditees employed non-Big Four auditors.

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is then the difference: 
(most previous studies test for a premium using a
binary variable in a single regression, so the pre-
mium is constant at b). In practice we compute
these statistics for two ‘typical’ (average) auditees:
the first has the values for the regressors equal to
the mean values for the Big Four auditees (X–––––kBIG4 )
and the other the mean values for the non-Big Four
auditees (X–––––kNON ).6 This gives two estimates (P) of
the Big Four premium, shown in Figure 2.
PBIG4 represents the predicted fees paid by a typ-
ical Big Four auditee to a Big Four auditor minus
the predicted log of fees paid by the same auditee
to a non-Big Four auditor; whereas PNON repre-
sents the difference between predicted fees for a
typical non-Big Four auditee paid to a Big Four
auditor and the predicted fees paid to a non-Big
Four auditor. Although not typically used in audit-
ing research, these statistics are widely used else-
where as part of an Oaxaca-Blinder (OB)
decomposition analysis (see the Appendix, Oaxaca
(1973), Blinder (1973) and Greene (2003: 53) for
further details).
Recent developments in the auditing literature,
however, point out that conventional OLS esti-
mates of the Big Four premium are potentially bi-
ased since auditors are not appointed randomly by
their clients and because auditor choice may be
systematically related to auditees’ unobservable
characteristics (e.g. insiders’ knowledge of the
riskiness of future cash flows). Ireland and Lennox
(2002: 75) note ‘although the standard OLS audit
fee models control for observable differences,
characteristics that are not observable to the aca-
demic researcher may affect both fees and auditor
choice and thereby cause bias.’ However, it is not
entirely clear from previous research what such
unobservable characteristics represent or how im-
portant they are in systematically influencing audi-
tor selection and audit fees. Titman and Trueman
(1986) and Datar et al. (1991) each develop mod-
els predicting that auditor quality is a function of
firm-specific risk, of which firm insiders are better
informed than outsiders. But both models make
competing predictions about the nature of the rela-
tionship between firm-specific risk and auditor
quality: Datar et al. (1991) predict that entrepre-
neurs of risky firms choose higher quality auditors,
whereas Titman and Trueman (1986) predict the
opposite.
Selection models
Selection bias arises if the unobservable charac-
teristics of Big Four and non-Big Four auditees are
systematically different from each other. Suppose
that εNON and εBIG4 in equations (1) and (2) above
are drawn from the same distribution but that 
Big Four auditees and non-Big Four auditees only
have positive and negative errors respectively.7
Estimating fee equations with standard single-stage
OLS omits the conditional means (by assuming
E(εBIG4) = E(εNON) = 0) and leads to inconsistent
estimates if these terms are correlated with the re-
gressors. The Heckman two-step procedure pro-
vides an estimate of the mean of the conditional
error known as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) or
the selection term λ, which augments the regres-
sors in equations (1) and (2) above. The procedure
involves estimating a probit model of auditor
choice as the first stage; this model yields esti-
mates of selection terms λBIG4 and λNON which are
then included in the audit fee equations in the sec-
ond stage. OLS applied to the augmented equa-
tions yields consistent coefficient estimates and
standard hypothesis tests can be applied with 
modified formulae for the standard errors. The
Heckman procedure thus estimates the equations
shown in Figure 3.
The Appendix provides a more formal descrip-
tion of the model and the derivation of the selec-
tion terms. The probit and audit fee equations in
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 143
Figure 2
Estimates of the Big Four premium
(3)
(4)
6 This choice ensures that the errors play no role as the
means of the predicted errors are zero and would seem reason-
able on the basis that the mean represents the expected value
of the characteristics of a Big Four auditee.
7 For example, if the positive error measures the unobserved
value to the auditee of appointing a Big Four auditor, then Big
Four auditees will value Big Four auditors more than non-Big
Four auditors and therefore pay higher fees.
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the Heckman model can also be estimated simulta-
neously by maximum likelihood (ML), which
leads to more efficient estimates if the model is
correctly specified. Accordingly, we report both
conventional Heckman two-step and ML estimates
in our empirical analysis.
Although the Heckman procedure has become
increasingly popular in accounting research and in
the finance literature (e.g. Li and Prabhala, 2007),
its robustness has been questioned under certain
conditions. For example, Giles (2003: 1299) notes
‘Heckman’s sample selectivity correction method-
ology offers a way of improving on the estimates
obtained with non-random samples. While there is
improvement in general in this regard, there are
situations in which the correction for sample selec-
tivity actually aggravates the problem.’
It is commonplace to assume joint normality of
the distribution of the errors in the selection and
outcome equations and that any systematic unob-
servable variables are normally distributed (an
untestable assumption). Joint normality has the
surprising and unfortunate implication that
collinearity between the selection term and the
other regressors in the second stage equation is
often severe, leading to serious model instability
(e.g. Leung and Yu, 2000). In addition, it is com-
mon for researchers to identify the second stage
equation via the non-linearity of the selection term
only. However, recent econometric analyses of this
issue suggest that to adequately identify the model
it should contain a valid instrument, i.e. a regres-
sor which determines the choice of auditor but has
no significant effect on determining audit fees
(Little, 1985; and Puhani, 2000). But collinearity
may cause problems even when an instrument
(also known as an exclusion or identifying vari-
able) is employed, leading to unstable estimates of
treatment effects (Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997;
Leung and Yu, 2000; Li and Prabhala, 2007).
Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising
that, as noted above, empirical results in auditing
research using the Heckman model have, to date,
been mixed.8
In the absence of satisfactory instruments, the
selection effect is best identified by extreme obser-
vations of the selection term λ, i.e. those compa-
nies with an estimated probability of choosing a
Big Four auditor close to 1. These Big Four audi-
tees (usually because of their large size and com-
plexity) effectively have no surrogate non-Big
Four counterfactuals – that is, there is no ‘common
support’ – the common support region being where
Big Four clients have non-Big Four counterparts
with similar characteristics. Following Black and
Smith (2004), we therefore assess the robustness
of the Heckman results by estimating models using
samples with different values of the selection term.
Matching estimators
The problems of model sensitivity, lack of ro-
bustness, linear functional form assumptions and
the need for adequate counterfactuals motivate the
use of matching methods. These methods are gain-
ing in popularity in the applied econometrics liter-
ature (e.g. Bryson et al., 2002; Black and Smith,
2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006) and are based
on matching the observable characteristics of
members in the treatment group (i.e. Big Four au-
ditees in our case) to members (counterfactuals) in
the untreated group (non-Big Four auditees).
Matching analyses are based on two important as-
sumptions: (1) the conditional independence as-
sumption (CIA) and (2) common support. The
former requires the value of audit fees to be inde-
pendent of auditor type given the values of some
observable variables, whereas the latter involves
comparable observations existing in both groups.
Both assumptions are discussed at greater length in
the Appendix.
A limitation of matching methods is that they
cannot accommodate any systematic effects of un-
observable auditee characteristics that have a joint
impact upon auditor selection and audit fees (al-
though as discussed above, it is not obvious what
these systematic effects might be or what their 
directional influence is). Whereas the Heckman
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Figure 3
Equations for Heckman procedure
For Big Four auditees (5)
For non-Big Four auditees (6)
8 Though it is, of course, plausible that the variation in these
findings is attributable to differences in the underlying eco-
nomic situations (e.g. private limited versus public quoted
company markets).
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approach allows such unobservable factors to in-
fluence auditor choice systematically, it is often
sensitive to specification and collinearity, as dis-
cussed above. Although they cannot deal directly
with unobservables, matching estimators do not
rely on linear extrapolation (outside the common
support region) or functional form assumptions;
nor do they require an exclusion variable or im-
pose joint normality assumptions. As noted by
Simonsen and Skipper (2006), matching methods
are based on matching on observable characteris-
tics of members in the treatment group (Big Four
auditees in our research) to members (counterfac-
tuals) in the untreated group (non-Big Four audi-
tees) and hence ‘balancing the bias arising from
self-selection … Matching allows for heteroge-
neous treatment effects, is not subject to paramet-
ric assumptions and does not per se assume
separability of observables and unobservables’
(ibid.: 920).
When applying matching methods, there are var-
ious estimators to choose from, reflecting a trade-
off in respect of the number of variables used to
match on, the closeness with which the variables
are matched (particularly continuous variables),
and the sample size. This is referred to as the
‘curse of dimensionality’ (Ho et al., 2007) since
close matching on more than a few variables (di-
mensions) might result in matched samples that
are too small for any meaningful analysis.
The first matching method we use – propensity
score matching – has recently been employed in
applied econometrics research (e.g. Black and
Smith, 2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006), but
not in the auditing literature to date. The method
(see Appendix for more details) is implemented as
follows. First the selection equation is estimated
using a parametric estimator of the auditor selec-
tion equation (in our case a probit model) and the
probabilities (propensity scores) of choosing a Big
Four auditor are obtained for all sample firms.
Each Big Four auditee is then matched to a non-
Big Four auditee with a similar propensity score
and differences in audit fees compared across the
two matched samples. As noted by Black and
Smith (2004: 110), the logic underpinning this
method is that ‘subgroups with values of X [ex-
planatory variables] that imply the same probabil-
ity of treatment can be combined because they will
always appear in the treatment and (matched)
comparison groups in the same proportion. As a
result, any differences between subgroups with
different X but the same propensity score balance
out when constructing the estimates.’ Hence, an
important practical advantage of propensity score
matching is that subgroups are matched on one
variable, obviating the need for very large samples
when subgroups are to be matched according to
several characteristics. Moreover, propensity score
matching does not make the same functional form
assumptions as linear regression and non-linear re-
lationships (of which there is some evidence in the
literature – e.g. Peel and Roberts, 2003; Chaney et
al., 2005) can be allowed for.
The second matching approach we take is an in-
termediate (semi-parametric) one which combines
matching with the standard OLS regression used in
the majority of prior studies. This approach in-
volves matching observations according to impor-
tant actual client characteristics prior to a standard
parametric analysis, in line with the methods advo-
cated by Ho et al. (2007), who highlight the poten-
tially serious pitfalls of drawing inferences from
sensitive statistical models. Initially we preprocess
our data, then estimate the standard audit-fee
model with a binary Big Four indicator variable.
Preprocessing involves matching Big Four and
non-Big Four auditees only on key attributes
(well-tested measures of auditee size, complexity
and risk) thereby ensuring a sufficient number of
matched observations to conduct standard OLS re-
gression techniques to control for any remaining
confounding factors. We initially sort our full sam-
ple into quantiles based on the key attributes of
sales (40 quantiles), the ratio of exports to sales
(11 quantiles), return on total assets (40 quantiles)
and the number of subsidiaries (10 quantiles). We
then match each Big Four client to a non-Big Four
client jointly sharing membership of each respec-
tive quantile for size, risk and complexity. It is 
important to note that this is a simultaneous re-
quirement, i.e. matched auditees have similar size
and risk and complexity characteristics and is
therefore a stricter set of criteria than propensity
score matching, since the latter is a composite (al-
beit conditional) score.
Since this process results in a large number of
potential matched combinations, we perform this
procedure 2,000 times. Each time, we estimate an
OLS regression and for each iteration, we capture
the coefficient for the binary Big Four indicator
variable (representing the premium charged to
similar Big Four and non-Big Four auditees) and
report the results for the distribution of this coeffi-
cient. As stated by Ho et al. (2007: 3) this pre-pro-
cessing approach combines the merits of both
non-parametric matching with conventional para-
metric estimators: ‘In a sense our recommenda-
tions already constitute best practice since
matching alone is not a method of estimation and
always requires some technique to compute esti-
mates … we simply point out that, except in the
extraordinary case where matching is exact, para-
metric procedures have the potential to greatly im-
prove causal inferences even after matching.’ In
summary, while the Heckman model presents a
potential solution to the important problem of se-
lection bias, it may produce imprecise results.
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Matching techniques are becoming increasingly
popular, since as noted by Li and Prabhala, (2007:
51), ‘They represent an attractive means of infer-
ence because they are simple to implement and
yield readily interpretable estimates of ‘‘treatment
effects ’’’. However, they are based on different as-
sumptions to the Heckman model, principally be-
cause they assume that any unobservables are
unimportant (Li and Prabhala, 2007). If unobserv-
able client characteristics determine both auditor
choice and audit fees, matching estimators pro-
duce potentially biased results. Since the theoreti-
cal research into the determinants of auditor choice
is inconclusive and the nature and role of unob-
servables are unclear, however, matching methods
seem an appropriate means to assess the robust-
ness of the Big Four premium in recent auditing
research.9 The next section outlines the variables
and data used in our empirical analysis.
3. Variables and data
3.1. Variables
Our main empirical model of audit fees takes the
standard linear form as in Figure 4.
The variables used in the model are described 
in Table 1 and have been widely employed in 
prior research (e.g. Simunic, 1980; Pong and
Whittington, 1994; Chan et al., 1993; Ezzamel 
et al. 1996; Chaney et al., 2004; McMeeking et al.,
2006; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007).10
Since corporate size (serving as a proxy for audit
effort) has been found to be the key driver of 
external audit fees in previous research, we em-
ploy both total assets (£) and turnover (£) as 
auditee size measures in our research. Pong and
Whittington (1994: 1075) note that audits have
two broad dimensions: ‘an audit of transactions
and verification of assets. The former will be relat-
ed to turnover and the latter to total assets.’
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Table 1
Variable definitions
Label Definition
lnAFEE Natural log of audit fee (in £)
lnSAL Natural log of turnover (in £)
lnTA Natural log of total assets (in £)
SQSUBS Square root of the number of subsidiaries
EXPSAL Ratio of non-UK turnover to total turnover
QUALIF Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company had qualified audit report, 0 otherwise
PBAL Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed a post-balance sheet event in 
accounts, 0 otherwise
CONLIAB Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed contingent liabilities in accounts,
0 otherwise
EXITEM Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed exceptional and/or extraordinary
items in accounts, 0 otherwise
RTA Ratio of profit before tax to total assets
TLTA Ratio of total liabilities to total assets
LOND Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company is located in London, 0 otherwise
BUSY Binary variable taking the value of 1 if firm’s year-end is in December or March, 0 otherwise
BIG4 Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company is audited by a Big Four auditor, 0 otherwise
CHTA Absolute value of change in total assets from year t-1 to year t
9 Since prior research on this specific issue is relatively rare
and has produced inconsistent results, further research into the
identification and examination of such unobservable charac-
teristics seems warranted.
10 Naturally, the binary variable BIG4 is omitted where the
equations are estimated separately. As noted by an anonymous
referee, a potentially important variable not included in our
analysis is non-audit (consultancy) fees. This variable has
been found to be significantly related to audit fees in a num-
ber of studies of listed companies; however, since private
companies are not required to disclose their non-audit fees, the
data are not available for most private companies (i.e. other
than for those that voluntarily disclose them). This is a poten-
tial limitation of our research, since the distinction between
the two types of fees is not always clear – though previous
Heckman (two-step) research into UK private firms also omits
non-audit fees, so our results are comparable in this respect.
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Following previous studies, we specify the rela-
tionship between audit fees (lnAFEE) and the size
measures for turnover (lnSAL) and total assets
(lnTA) in natural logarithmic form to capture po-
tential economies of scale in the audit. In order to
control for audit complexity, we include a variable
labelled SQSUBS, defined as the square root of the
number of subsidiaries (e.g. Francis and Simon,
1987), and EXPSAL – the ratio of non-UK
turnover to total turnover (e.g. Beatty, 1993:
Chaney et al., 2004), both of which we expect to
be positively related to audit fees.
To capture auditee risk characteristics, we em-
ploy the gearing ratio of total liabilities to total as-
sets (TLTA) and the ratio of net profit before tax to
total assets (RTA), which we expect to be positive-
ly and negatively related to audit fees, respective-
ly (e.g. Chan et al., 1993; Firth, 1997). Following
previous research (e.g. Chaney et al., 2004;
Clatworthy and Peel, 2007) we employ three addi-
tional binary variables to capture incremental
risk/complexity in the audit. These are whether
(coded 1) or not (coded 0) the audit client received
a qualified audit report (QUALIF), reported excep-
tional and/or extraordinary items (EXITEM), dis-
closed a post-balance sheet event (PBAL) or a
contingent liability (CONLIAB). All these vari-
ables are expected to be positively related to audit
fees (ibid.).11 Finally, we include binary variables
for whether (coded 1) or not (coded 0) companies
are audited by a Big Four auditor (BIG4), whether
the audit client’s year-end falls in December or
March (BUSY) and whether the company is locat-
ed in London (LOND). The latter two variables are
expected to be positively related to audit fees since
companies audited during the ‘busy’ period may
be charged higher fees due to the higher opportu-
nity cost of audit resources (e.g. McMeeking et al.,
2006) while companies located in London are 
expected to pay higher audit fees reflecting cost 
of living differentials (Chaney et al., 2004;
Clatworthy and Peel, 2007).
Other than in respect of corporate size and com-
plexity, the literature on the choice of variables in
the auditor selection model is less developed and
prior studies are usually based on including a sub-
group of variables from the audit fee equation in
the selection model (Chaney et al., 2004, 2005;
Hamilton et al., 2005, but cf. Ireland and Lennox,
2002). If one assumes that firms choose auditor
type by comparing their predicted costs (fees), the
choice of auditor type depends on all the factors
affecting the fees charged by either type of auditor.
We therefore included all variables from the fee
equations in the auditor choice model. When all or
a subset of the regressors from the fees equation is
used, identification relies on the non-linearity of
the selection term but this non-linearity may not 
be sufficient to produce convincing estimates. It is
important therefore to include an identification
variable that is significantly associated with audi-
tor choice (in the probit model), but not with audit
fees (in the fees equation). Such variables are ex-
tremely hard to obtain in practice (see, e.g. Puhani,
2000). We considered several plausible instru-
ments12 and found only one – the change in the ab-
solute value of total assets (CHTA) between the
current and preceding year – which was statistical-
ly significant (with the expected sign) in the probit
selection model, but statistically insignificant
when included in the OLS audit fee models.13
Furthermore it is not formally a ‘weak’ instrument
since it has an F-statistic of 11.21 for the null that
it is insignificant in the regression of auditor type
(D) on all the regressors. This exceeds the critical
value of 8.96 for the validity of a single instrument
given by Stock et al. (2002) and the informal value
of 10 that is widely used and advocated by Stock
and Watson (2003: 350).
The motivation for CHTA being included in the
selection model is that companies involved in
large investments/acquisition or divestments/sale
of assets, may require the expertise of a Big Four 
auditor due to the additional complexity of the
audit. In addition, Keasey and Watson (1991) note
that the absolute change in firm size (total assets)
may, from an agency perspective, act as a proxy 
for contractual changes at the firm level, which
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Figure 4
Empirical model of audit fees
lnAFEE = α0+ β1lnSAL + β2lnTA + β3SQSUBS + β4EXPSAL + β5QUALIF + β6PBAL + β7CONLIAB (7)
+ β8EXITEM + β9RTA + β10TLTA + β11LOND + β12BUSY + β13BIG4 + ε
11 Because company records on the database we use (FAME)
only indicate whether or not either of these events occurred, we
are unable to refine PBAL or CONLIAB to take account of the
types of events or the nature of liabilities. Hence, we assess
their average impact. We were also unable to ascertain the na-
ture of the qualification and hence through QUALIF, we again
measure the average impact of a qualified audit report.
12 These included changes in sales, change in equity, change
in total assets and various transformations of these variables.
13 The t-values for the CHTA coefficients when included in
models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3 below were, respectively: 0.05,
1.32 and 0.18.
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could prompt a change in the demand for auditing 
services. Hence, large auditors may be associated
with reducing agency costs (e.g. Ireland and
Lennox, 2002) in companies with large asset 
variations. Although it has desirable theoretical
qualities, it is also employed for pragmatic rea-
sons, since it formally fulfils its main purpose of
properly identifying the audit fee equations. Our
empirical model of auditor selection is shown in
Figure 5.
Following previous studies (e.g. Chaney et al.,
2004; Hamilton et al., 2005), we expect the vari-
ables reflecting auditee size (lnSAL and lnTA) and
complexity (SQSUBS and EXPSAL) to be positive-
ly associated with the choice of a Big Four auditor
in the probit model, in consequence of their hy-
pothesised capacity to provide more efficient au-
dits and to reduce agency costs (ibid.). In line with
prior research (e.g. Ireland and Lennox, 2002;
Chaney et al., 2004, 2005), we also expect our au-
ditee risk variables (QUALIF, PBAL, CONLIAB,
EXITEM, RTA and TLTA) to be positively associat-
ed with the selection of a Big Four auditor.14 As
noted by Hamilton et al. (2005: 9), ‘The greater the
client’s risk, the higher the propensity for the im-
pairment of agency relationships. To mitigate the
associated agency costs, higher quality auditors,
surrogated by big 4, are more likely to be selected
to signal the credibility of reporting.’ Furthermore,
Datar et al. (1991) predict, and Copley and
Douthett (2002) find, a positive relationship be-
tween auditee risk and the appointment of a high-
er quality auditor.
For the final two variables (LOND and BUSY),
we have no strong prior expectations about their
influence on auditor choice, although the univari-
ate results of extant studies (as in the current
study) have consistently reported (for both private
and quoted audit clients) that a significantly high-
er proportion of Big Four auditors conduct their
audits during the busy period, while a significant-
ly higher proportion of non-Big Four auditors are
appointed to companies located in London (e.g.
Ireland and Lennox, 2002; Chaney et al., 2004).
3.2. Data
The source of our data is the Bureau Van Dijk
FAME DVD-ROM UK database. Financial data
(annual accounts) and non-financial data (e.g.
company location, auditor and audit qualification)
are available as individual records for each compa-
ny on the database. Companies were included if
they met the following criteria: their primary activ-
ities (according to FAME primary SIC codes) were
outside the financial sector; they were private lim-
ited companies; they were ‘live’ companies (i.e.
had not ceased trading, failed or entered into vol-
untary liquidation); their audited accounts were
available on FAME; they had full data available,
including total assets and sales (minimum £1,000),
audit fee (minimum £100), and a disclosed
profit/loss figure. In order to avoid the potential
confounding influences of including both holding
companies and their subsidiaries in the regression
model (e.g. Ezzamel et al., 1996; Peel and Roberts,
2003), our sample only includes independent com-
panies (i.e. those not held as a subsidiary of anoth-
er company). In line with previous studies (e.g.
Firth, 1997), financial companies were excluded
due to the different composition of their financial
statements and only live companies were selected
to avoid the confounding influence of including
non-live auditees. In addition, and in line with pre-
vious research, 11 companies with joint auditors
(none of which were Big Four auditors) were ex-
cluded from the analysis to comply with the bina-
ry nature of the probit model. Following these
restrictions, we obtained the necessary data for a
sample of 36,674 private companies from FAME
for the latest financial statements available (pre-
dominantly for the calendar year 2003).15 It is very
important to note (since it has significant effects
on both sample size and data accuracy) that the
FAME default setting for downloading data is
£000s, with data being rounded to the nearest
£1,000; for example an audit fee of £1,550 would
be rounded to £2,000 and one of £400 to zero (i.e.
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Figure 5
Empirical model of auditor selection
BIG4 = δ0+ δ1lnSAL + δ2lnTA + δ3SQSUBS + δ4EXPSAL + δ5QUALIF + δ6PBAL + δ7CONLIAB (8)
+ δ8EXITEM + δ9RTA + δ10TLTA + δ11LOND + δ12BUSY + δ13CHTA + ε
14 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, it is possible that if
large auditors do not favour small companies due to lower re-
turn relative to the risk involved, small firms will have to pay
more to retain a large auditor. This does not, however, pre-
clude small companies paying such a premium if they believe
the quality of audit to be higher for the reasons discussed
above.
15 A possible limitation of our work is that we employ a
cross-sectional, rather than a panel-based sample. Prior re-
search by Chaney et al. (2004) suggests that private company
audit fee models do not vary much over time. Their sample
covers a five-year period and there is little variation in their
annual estimates; however, cf. McMeeking et al. (2006), who
do find inter-temporal variation for listed companies.
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a missing value). Data can, however, be down-
loaded (as in the current study) in £ and hence nei-
ther data accuracy nor observations are lost using
this option. The sampling consequences of this are
not trivial, since downloading in £ captures a large
number of smaller firms. For instance, Chaney 
et al. (2004), whose sample excludes many small
companies due to the imprecision associated with
downloading in £000, report Big Four concentra-
tion of 50% compared to 8% in our sample.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
The average audit fee (AFEE) for the whole sam-
ple (n = 36,674) amounted to £7.80k, with compa-
nies having mean sales (SAL) and total assets (TA)
of £7.97m and £5.86m respectively. Sales range
from a minimum of £1k to a maximum of £4,979m
and total assets from £1k to £5,234m. Table 2 also
shows that, other than audit qualifications
(QUALIF), all variables differ significantly be-
tween the Big Four (n = 3,038) and the non-Big
Four (n = 33,636) sub-samples. Consistent with
prior expectations, Big Four clients are significant-
ly larger (as measured by both SAL and TA), have
more subsidiaries (SUBS), have a higher propor-
tion of foreign to total sales (EXPSAL) and report
more post balance sheet events (PBAL), contingent
liabilities (CONLIAB) and exceptional items 
(EXITEM). In addition, Big Four clients are less
profitable (RTA) more highly geared (TLTA), less
likely to be located in London (LOND), more like-
ly to be audited during the busy period (BUSY),
with a significantly higher absolute change in the
value of total assets (CHTA). Due to the large num-
ber of small auditees represented in the non-Big
Four sample, the differences in size between Big
Four (average sales and total assets of £39.41m
and £35.62m) and non-Big Four auditees (average
sales and total assets of £5.13m and £3.17m) are
substantial.
4. Empirical results
We commence our analysis with standard single-
stage OLS regression under the assumption of no
selection bias. We then report our comparative
analysis employing the two-step Heckman proce-
dure, together with associated robustness tests.
Finally, we present the results of the matching pro-
cedures.
4.1. Single stage results
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the OLS estimates for
the standard pooled audit fee specification, which
is employed in many previous studies. All explana-
tory variables take their expected signs and other
than the busy period variable (BUSY), which is sta-
tistically significant at the 0.10 level (p = 0.079),
all are highly significant (p < 0.0001 in all cases).
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 149
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Big Four clients Non-Big Four clients Total sample
(n = 3,038) (n = 33,636) (n = 36,674)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median Mean Std. dev. Median Mean Std. dev. Median Sig.
AFEE (£000) 29.05 80.47 13.00 5.88 13.12 2.75 7.80 27.11 3.00 ‡§
lnAFEE 9.44 1.25 9.47 7.91 1.22 7.92 8.04 1.29 8.01 ‡§
SAL (£m) 39.41 150.62 8.14 5.13 21.46 0.84 7.97 48.89 1.02 ‡§
TA (£m) 35.62 159.41 6.08 3.17 14.49 0.48 5.86 48.75 0.59 ‡§
SUBS 3.46 8.37 1.00 0.61 2.46 0.00 0.84 3.46 0.00 ‡§
EXPSAL 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 ‡§
QUALIF 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00
PBAL 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00 ψ
CONLIAB 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 ψ
EXITEM 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 ψ
RTA 0.01 0.38 0.03 0.23 0.78 0.07 0.21 0.76 0.07 ‡§
TLTA 0.84 1.51 0.73 0.77 1.15 0.66 0.78 1.18 0.67 ‡§
LOND 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 ψ
BUSY 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 ψ
CHTA (£m) 5.26 33.82 0.61 0.49 2.71 0.05 0.88 10.16 0.06 ‡§
Notes:
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.
‡ and § indicate means and distributions are significantly different between Big Four and non-Big Four clients
at the 0.01 level in t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests respectively.
ψ indicates significant difference between Big Four and non-Big Four clients at the 0.01 level in a chi-squared
test.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:11
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
150 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Ta
bl
e 
3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
re
su
lts
O
LS
 si
ng
le
 st
ag
e 
m
od
el
s
M
LE
 tw
o-
st
ep
 m
od
el
s
H
ec
km
an
 tw
o-
st
ep
 m
od
el
s
M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
M
od
el
 3
M
o
de
l 4
a
M
od
el
 5
a
M
od
el
 6
a
M
od
el
 4
b
M
od
el
 5
b
M
od
el
 6
b
(P
oo
led
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
(P
ro
bi
t 
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
(P
ro
bi
t 
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
fee
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
ch
oi
ce
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
ch
oi
ce
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
ln
SA
L
0.
28
4
0.
28
5
0.
28
6
–
0.
00
4
0.
28
5
0.
28
6
–
0.
00
5
0.
28
5
0.
28
5
(87
.31
)**
(25
.08
)**
(83
.84
)**
(0.
48
)
(30
.93
)**
(96
.44
)**
(0.
50
)
(29
.51
)**
(92
.71
)**
ln
TA
0.
12
2
0.
12
0
0.
12
0
0.
24
6
0.
14
9
0.
11
3
0.
24
6
0.
21
1
0.
10
1
(36
.28
)**
(10
.30
)**
(33
.54
)**
(23
.25
)**
(8.
00
)**
(34
.86
)**
(23
.20
)**
(5.
41
)**
(25
.46
)**
SQ
SU
BS
0.
25
8
0.
20
1
0.
28
1
0.
08
7
0.
20
9
0.
26
8
0.
08
8
0.
22
7
0.
24
7
(44
.70
)**
(19
.07
)**
(40
.10
)**
(6.
98
)**
(19
.81
)**
(46
.05
)**
(7.
03
)**
(15
.28
)**
(34
.78
)**
EX
PS
AL
0.
36
7
0.
62
7
0.
29
3
0.
60
7
0.
68
8
0.
25
3
0.
60
2
0.
82
2
0.
19
1
(13
.15
)**
(10
.91
)**
(9.
41
)**
(9.
84
)**
(11
.3
4)*
*
(8.
98
)**
(9.
77
)**
(8.
36
)**
(6.
17
)**
QU
AL
IF
0.
11
5
0.
14
1
0.
11
1
–
0.
14
6
0.
12
6
0.
11
8
–
0.
14
6
0.
09
4
0.
12
8
(6.
18
)**
(2.
56
)*
(5.
58
)**
(2.
61
)**
(2.
30
)*
(6.
06
)**
(2.
61
)**
(1.
57
)
(6.
36
)**
PB
AL
0.
11
9
0.
17
9
0.
09
8
0.
16
9
0.
19
6
0.
08
4
0.
16
9
0.
23
3
0.
06
3
(7.
74
)**
(5.
65
)**
(5.
62
)**
(4.
23
)**
(5.
85
)**
(4.
69
)**
(4.
23
)**
(5.
62
)**
(3.
34
)**
CO
NL
IA
B
0.
09
5
0.
06
4
0.
09
9
0.
01
4
0.
06
4
0.
09
6
0.
01
3
0.
06
6
0.
09
1
(8.
93
)**
(2.
64
)**
(8.
47
)**
(0.
48
)
(2.
57
)*
(7.
68
)**
(0.
45
)
(2.
45
)*
(7.
09
)**
EX
IT
EM
0.
13
1
0.
12
6
0.
13
0
–
0.
08
1
0.
11
8
0.
13
3
–
0.
08
0
0.
10
0
0.
13
7
(17
.04
)**
(5.
57
)**
(15
.88
)**
(3.
38
)**
(5.
06
)**
(16
.14
)**
(3.
35
)**
(3.
78
)**
(15
.99
)**
TL
TA
0.
02
6
–
0.
00
9
0.
02
9
0.
07
6
–
0.
00
4
0.
02
5
0.
07
6
0.
00
7
0.
01
9
(6.
43
)**
(1.
31
)
(6.
24
)**
(9.
07
)**
(0.
48
)
(8.
04
)**
(8.
98
)**
(0.
59
)
(5.
38
)**
RT
A
–
0.
03
3
–
0.
11
1
–
0.
03
1
–
0.
23
1
–
0.
13
9
–
0.
03
1
–
0.
23
0
–
0.
19
9
–
0.
03
2
(7.
14
)**
(3.
28
)**
(6.
65
)**
(8.
12
)**
(3.
87
)**
(6.
82
)**
(8.
10
)**
(4.
02
)**
(6.
54
)**
LO
ND
0.
20
8
0.
33
8
0.
20
0
–
0.
30
6
0.
30
6
0.
21
0
–
0.
30
5
0.
23
7
0.
22
6
(29
.69
)**
(12
.38
)**
(27
.63
)**
(12
.15
)**
(9.
93
)**
(29
.10
)**
(12
.11
)**
(4.
72
)**
(27
.93
)**
BU
SY
0.
01
1
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
15
3
0.
02
6
0.
00
4
0.
15
2
0.
06
01
–
0.
00
5
(1.
76
)
(0.
52
)
(1.
51
)
(7.
12
)**
(1.
18
)
(0.
63
)
(7.
10
)**
(2.
01
)*
(0.
65
)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:11
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 151
Ta
bl
e 
3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
re
su
lts
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
O
LS
 si
ng
le
 st
ag
e 
m
od
el
s
M
LE
 tw
o-
st
ep
 m
od
el
s
H
ec
km
an
 tw
o-
st
ep
 m
od
el
s
M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
M
o
de
l 3
M
o
de
l 4
a
M
od
el
 5
a
M
od
el
 6
a
M
od
el
 4
b
M
od
el
 5
b
M
od
el
 6
b
(P
oo
led
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
(P
ro
bi
t 
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
(P
ro
bi
t 
(B
ig 
Fo
ur
 
(N
on
-B
ig 
fee
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
ch
oi
ce
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
ch
oi
ce
)
fee
)
Fo
ur
 fe
e)
CO
NS
TA
NT
2.
29
9
2.
63
8
2.
30
2
–
4.
88
6
1.
96
7
2.
37
8
–
4.
87
0
0.
51
1
2.
49
9
(88
.49
)**
(23
.07
)**
(83
.80
)**
(46
.58
)**
(5.
14
)**
(87
.60
)**
(46
.62
)**
(0.
58
)
(69
.11
)**
BI
G
4
0.
27
0
(22
.96
)**
CH
TA
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
(4.
17
)**
(4.
27
)**
IM
R 
(λ
)
0.
14
2
–
0.
19
9
0.
44
6
–
0.
50
9
(1.
80
)
(9.
56
)**
(2.
42
)**
(8.
39
)**
N
36
,6
74
3,
03
8
33
,6
36
36
,6
74
3,
03
8
33
,6
36
36
,6
74
3,
03
8
33
,6
36
A
dj.
 R2
0.
78
0.
80
0.
75
–
–
–
–
0.
80
0.
75
No
te
s:
 T
hi
s t
ab
le
 re
po
rts
 re
gr
es
sio
n 
es
tim
at
es
 w
he
re
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is 
ln
A
FE
E 
fo
r a
ll 
m
od
el
s, 
ex
ce
pt
 M
od
el
s 4
a 
an
d 
4b
 w
he
re
 th
e 
bi
na
ry
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
co
de
d 
1 
if 
th
e 
fir
m
 is
 a
ud
ite
d 
by
 a
 B
ig
 F
ou
r f
irm
, 0
 o
th
er
w
ise
. V
ar
ia
bl
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s a
re
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 T
ab
le
 1
. A
bs
ol
ut
e 
t-
st
at
ist
ic
s a
re
 re
po
rte
d 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
M
od
el
s 4
b–
6b
, w
he
re
 z-
st
at
ist
ic
s a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
; t
-
st
at
ist
ic
s f
or
 O
LS
 m
od
el
s u
se
 ro
bu
st 
sta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
nd
 c
or
re
ct
ed
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rro
rs
 fo
r t
he
 H
ec
km
an
 tw
o-
ste
p 
m
od
-
el
s. 
* 
an
d 
**
 in
di
ca
te
 st
at
ist
ic
al
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 0
.0
5 
an
d 
0.
01
 le
ve
ls 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:11
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
In particular, we note that the BIG4 coefficient
(0.270) implies that, on average, the audit fees of a
non-Big Four auditee would increase by 31% if it
were to employ a Big Four auditor.16 Also note-
worthy is that the model explains a relatively high
proportion (R2 of 78%) of the variation in the audit
fees of UK private companies, comparing
favourably with that (57%) reported by Chaney 
et al. (2004) for their sample of UK private firms.
Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 report OLS estimates
for separate audit fee equations for the Big Four
and non-Big Four auditee samples. In Model 1, the
Big Four equation only differs by a constant from
the non-Big Four equation. In common with
Chaney et al. (2004) a joint F-test rejected the null
hypothesis (F = 13.43; p = 0.000) that the coeffi-
cients in the Models 2 and 3 were the same, imply-
ing that the fee-setting process differs between the
two auditor types. The main focus of our empirical
analysis is therefore Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 (i.e.
those which allow the slope coefficients of the ex-
planatory variables to differ for the Big Four and
non-Big Four models).
Table 3 shows that for the non-Big Four specifi-
cation (Model 3) all explanatory variables exhibit
their expected signs and, other than for BUSY,
which loses statistical significance (p = 0.131), all
variables are highly significant (p < 0.0001 in all
cases). For the Big Four specification (Model 3),
in addition to BUSY, the sign on the gearing coef-
ficient (TLTA) is negative, but statistically insignif-
icant – a finding in common with Chaney et al.
(2004) for their Big Four equation; furthermore,
the intercept in Model 2 is larger than in Model 3
– a result also reported by Chaney et al. (2004) and
attributed to Big Four auditors recovering higher
expenditure on training and facilities.
To examine the premium in more detail, we con-
duct the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (discussed
above) on our estimates for Models 2 and 3. The
OB decomposition is based on measuring the pre-
mium (using the characteristics of the average Big
Four auditee) as in Figure 6.
Greene (2003: 54) provides the formulae for the
estimated standard errors of each term in the de-
composition and we report the t-values based on
this method in parentheses under the estimates.
There is a large and significant (p = 0.000) differ-
ence in the means of the audit fees paid by compa-
nies audited by Big Four and non-Big Four
auditors (1.5265) using the parameters from
Models 2 and 3. Most of this is accounted for by
differences in their respective client characteristics
(1.2709 or 83%). However, there is, on average, a
significant (p = 0.000) Big Four premium of
0.2556 (29.1%), which is close to that (31.0%) es-
timated in the pooled OLS equation (Model 1) and
in line with findings in prior research (e.g. Moizer,
1997). On average, Big Four auditees paid audit
fees of £12,537 (e9.4364), but would have paid
£9,710 if they were charged according to the non-
Big Four parameters (Model 3) – a reduction of
23%.17 Hence, the Oaxaca-Blinder results, based
on Models 2 and 3 are consistent with the presence
of a Big Four audit premium. The next section
presents our two-stage results where we analyse
the extent to which these findings are affected by
selection bias.
4.2. Heckman two-step regressions
Table 3 reports the two-step results with maxi-
mum likelihood estimates (MLE) and standard
Heckman two-step estimates. Models 4a and 4b
show the probit selection model estimates for the
choice of a Big Four auditor, while Models 5a (5b)
and 6a (6b) report the MLE (standard Heckman)
audit fee regression estimates for the Big Four and
non-Big Four auditees, including the additional
parameter λ (for the IMR estimated from the coef-
ficients in Model 4) to control for selection bias.
The MLE and standard Heckman two-step probit
selection models (4a and 4b) are very similar, and
in both models, all explanatory variables other
152 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 6
OB decomposition
(9)
Actual difference = Explained by characteristics + Big Four premium
9.4364 – 7.9099 = 9.1809 – 7.9099 + 9.4364 – 9.1809 (10)
1.5265 = 1.2709 + 0.2556
(263.6) (21.87)
16 We use the standard transformation ex – 1 (where x = the
coefficient or mean log difference) to compute percentages.
17 The alternative decomposition using the characteristics of
non-Big Four clients also implied a statistically significant
premium (at p = 0.000) of 31%.
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than CONLIAB and lnSAL are significantly associ-
ated with auditor choice at the 0.01 level. In partic-
ular, the coefficient on the identifying variable
(CHTA) exhibits its expected sign and is highly
statistically significant (p = 0.000).18 Also consis-
tent with expectations and prior research, Models
4a and 4b show that larger (lnTA), more complex
(SQSUBS; EXPSAL) and riskier (RTA; TLTA) com-
panies are more likely to appoint a Big Four audi-
tor. Companies receiving audit qualifications
(QUALIF) are more likely to employ a non-Big
Four auditor, in contrast to companies reporting a
post-balance sheet event (PBAL) and auditees
based in London, which are less likely to select a
Big Four auditor, although likely to do so if their
year ends fall in the busy period (BUSY).19
The audit fee equations (Models 5a, 6a, 5b and
6b) contain the same pattern of significance levels
as the single stage estimates in Models 2 and 3.
The MLE estimates in Table 3 show that the λ
coefficient is negative but highly significant 
(p = 0.000) for the non-Big Four equation (Model
6a), but positive and only significant at the 0.10
level (p = 0.071) in the Big Four equation (Model
5a). The positive MLE estimate of 0.142 (Model
5a) for the covariance σSBIG4 and the negative esti-
mate of –0.199 (Model 6a) for σSNON imply that an
increase in the value for the unobservable error in
the auditor selection equation (εSEL) is associated
with an increase in the value of the unobservable
component of Big Four fees (εBIG4) and a decrease
in the value of unobservable component of non-
Big Four fees (εNON), although the former estimate
is insignificant at the 0.05 level. These results
imply that the effect of unobservable auditee char-
acteristics is to cause private companies to choose
the most expensive auditor and directly contradict
the results of Chaney et al. (2004). The results also
imply non-Big Four auditees value each type of
auditor differently from Big Four auditees: not
only are they willing to pay more for non-Big Four
auditors; they also place a lower value on the serv-
ices of a Big Four auditor.20
The selection estimates of the Big Four premium
are also dependent on the estimator used. As the
results in Models 5b and 6b show, the standard
Heckman two-step approach amplifies the MLE
estimates. Although the λ coefficients have the
same signs as their MLE counterparts, and are
both significant at the 0.05 level in both equations,
they are implausibly large (in absolute terms) at
0.446 for the Big Four and –0.509 for the non-Big
Four auditees; thus the λ coefficient in the Big
Four equation more than doubles (compared to the
MLE). Further indications of model instability are
provided by the insignificance of the intercept and
QUALIF in the Big Four Heckman model (5b).
It has been acknowledged in prior research
(Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997) that interpreting
the magnitude of the λ coefficient is difficult due
to the abstract nature of the variable itself.
Extending the logic of our earlier decomposition to
the Heckman results is informative in this context
since it allows an assessment of the effects of the
coefficient. To calculate the impact of selection
bias on the Big Four premium by decomposing the
observable and unobservable effects, we concen-
trate on the Big Four premium measured at the
sample means of the Big Four auditees, i.e. the av-
erage effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT).
Predicted fees paid by a Big Four client at the sam-
ple means are shown in Figure 7.
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 153
Figure 7
Predicted fees
For Big Four clients (actual) (11)
For Big Four clients (counterfactual) (12)
18 The statistical insignificance of lnSAL in the auditor
choice equation is not related to collinearity with CHTA. When
CHTA was removed from Model 4, lnSAL remained statistical-
ly insignificant. In addition, when lnSAL was removed from
Model 4, CHTA remained positive and statistically significant.
19 The Wald statistic of 2668.40 (p < 0.0001) for Model 4b
indicates the selection equation is well determined; the
McFadden’s R2 is 0.204 and the model correctly classifies
(cut-off point of 0.083 – representing the prior probability of
selection into the Big Four) 77.52% and 70.81% of the Big
Four and non-Big Four auditees respectively.
20 Although a priori these findings may appear counterintu-
itive and may relate, as discussed below, to the lack of robust-
ness of Heckman procedures in audit fee studies, they are not
entirely implausible. As discussed earlier, there are numerous
explanations (e.g. audit quality effects) for firms paying high-
er fees for Big Four audits; similarly, survey-based research by
Marriott et al. (2007) finds that very small UK companies pre-
fer non-Big Four auditors due to the more personal services
and stronger relationships offered by smaller auditors. A fur-
ther possibility is that the potential financial gains arising from
switching auditor may not justify the associated costs.
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Figure 8
Estimates for Models 5a and 6a
For Big Four clients (actual) (13)
9.4364 = 9.2268 + 0.2096
And:
For Big Four clients (counterfactual) (14)
8.8230 = 9.1174 – 0.2944
Table 4
Effects of changes in specification on MLE and standard Heckman two-step models
Specification 1: Specification 2: 
full fee equation; full fee equation; selection 
full selection equation equation excludes CHTA
MLE Heckman MLE Heckman
Big Four λ coefficient 0.142 0.446 0.166 1.079
(1.80) (2.42)* (2.31)* (3.74)**
Non-Big Four λ coefficient –0.199 –0.509 –0.204 –0.595
(9.56)** (8.39)** (10.00)** (9.22)**
Big Four conditional meanΨ 9.436 9.436 9.436 9.436
Non-Big Four conditional mean 8.823 8.263 8.812 8.107
Difference (Big Four premium as ATT) 0.613 1.1729 0.624 1.329
Big Four unconditional mean 9.227 8.776 9.189 7.834
Non-Big Four unconditional mean 9.117 9.018 9.115 8.989
Difference (Big Four premium as ATE) 0.109 –0.242 0.074 –1.155
(0.93) (0.88) (0.69) (2.69)**
Big Four selection effect 0.210 0.660 0.246 1.602
Non-Big Four selection effect –0.294 –0.755 –0.303 –0.883
Difference in selection effect 0.504 1.415 0.549 2.485
(4.20)** (4.92)** (4.95)** (5.66)**
Big Four R2 (dep. var. = λ)§ 0.986 0.986 0.992 0.992
Non-Big Four R2 (dep. var. = λ)§ 0.854 0.858 0.868 0.874
Notes:
The table reports maximum likelihood (MLE) and standard Heckman estimates for three specifications of the
two-step correction model. Specification 1 corresponds to the MLE and Heckman models reported in Table 3.
Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses.
**, * represent statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.
Ψ The conditional mean is the predicted mean of audit fees conditional on the auditee choosing a Big Four or
non-Big Four auditor, allowing for auditees’ unobservable characteristics. The unconditional mean is the pre-
dicted mean of audit fees excluding the selection effects. The difference between the conditional and uncondi-
tional means is the selection effect.
§ reports the R2 for a regression of the selection term on the remaining variables in the audit fee (second stage)
equation.
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The counterfactual equation shows the predicted
audit fees for a typical Big Four client which paid
audit fees according to the non-Big Four model.
Since the same regressor means are used to com-
pute predicted audit fees, we have removed any
potential differences due to the different character-
istics (the explained differences) of the Big Four
and non-Big Four auditees, with any remaining
difference amounting to the Big Four premium
(the unexplained differences). The two compo-
nents of predicted audit fees estimate the separate
effects of the observable regressors and the unob-
servables. The decomposition of the counterfactu-
al audit fees ( lnF––––––NON ) comprises the predicted fees
paid to a non-Big Four auditor by any firm with
the same mean observable characteristics
( )
plus the selection effect (gSNONλBIG–––––––4,BIG4 ) showing
the predicted effect of unobservable characteris-
tics. The first term represents the unconditional
mean showing the predicted audit fees if the
clients chose Big Four and non-Big Four auditors
at random.21 The predicted fees ( lnF––– ) incorporate
the selection terms and are therefore referred to as
the conditional means.22 Hence, the predicted fee
equations have the form: conditional mean = un-
conditional mean + selection effect. The estimates
for Models 5a and 6a in Table 3 are shown in
Figure 8.
These estimates, along with those for non-Big
Four firms, are tabulated in Table 4. Thus the typ-
ical Big Four auditee actually paid fees in natural
log form of 9.4364 (£12,537). By contrast it would
have paid predicted fees as a non-Big Four auditee
of 8.8230 in natural log form (£6,789), implying a
Big Four premium of 0.6134 or 85%, which is
much larger than that found in prior research. Our
MLE results suggest that on average, Big Four au-
ditees would have paid 9.2268 (£10,166) for the
services of a Big Four auditor and 9.1174 (£9,113)
for a non-Big Four auditor if their unobservable
characteristics were ignored. However, in conse-
quence of Big Four auditees’ unobservable charac-
teristics, an additional 0.2096 is paid for Big Four
audit fees, and 0.2944 less for the services of a
non-Big Four auditor.
The average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) is the difference in the conditional means of
the audit fees paid by Big Four and non-Big Four
auditees and represents the difference in fees only
available to Big Four auditees. By contrast, the av-
erage treatment effect (ATE) shows the difference
in fees available to any auditee. The relationship
between the treatment effects is shown in Figure 9
(see Heckman et al., 2001).
Using the MLE parameters, the Big Four premi-
um paid by Big Four auditees or ATT is 0.6134
(85%). The typical Big Four auditee paid 0.1094
(12%) more in fees based on their observable char-
acteristics. This ATE (12%) is assumed to be freely
substitutable, in that any non-Big Four auditee
with the relevant characteristics who switched to a
large auditor would incur this premium and vice
versa. However the peculiar unobservable charac-
teristics of Big Four auditees (as reflected in their
value of λ) mean that they would pay an addition-
al 0.504 in natural log terms for the services of a
Big Four auditor, whereas the unobserved charac-
teristics of non-Big Four auditees means they
would be unwilling to pay this premium. Since the
selection effects are individually significant, they
should be included in the model. Although the ATE
is not economically insubstantial at 12%, it is not
significantly different from zero (t = 0.93; p = 0.35).
By contrast the large selection effect is highly sig-
nificant (t = 4.20; p = 0.00). According to our MLE
results, therefore, firms with similar observable
characteristics would pay higher fees if they used
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 155
Figure 9
Relationship between treatment effects
(15)
(ATT) = (ATE) + Estimate[E(εBIG4 | D = 1) – E(εNON | D = 1)]
Difference in conditional means = Difference in unconditional means + Difference in unobservable effect
9.4364 – 8.8230 = 9.2268 – 9.1174 + 0.2096 + 0.2944
0.6134 = 0.1094 + 0.504
21 Note that with random selection, there would be no selec-
tion effect.
22 They are conditional in the sense that they are estimates
of the expected audit fees conditional on the firm employing
either a Big Four or a non-Big Four auditor.
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a Big Four auditor, but the difference is statistical-
ly insignificant. However, auditees differ greatly
in their unobserved characteristics and these dif-
ferences largely generate the Big Four premium.
We emphasise that our results contrast sharply
with Chaney et al. (2004), who report that unob-
servable factors make it cheaper for Big Four au-
ditees to opt for Big Four auditors, rather than
non-Big Four ones.
The Heckman two-step results in Table 4
(Specification 1) show that the typical Big Four
auditee actually paid log fees of 9.436 (£12,537).
By contrast it is predicted to have incurred fees as
a non-Big Four auditee of 8.263 (£3,880) estimat-
ing the Big Four premium at an inconceivable
1.1729 or 223% (compared to 85% for the MLE
estimates discussed above). Big Four auditees
would have paid 8.776 (£6,478) for the services of
a Big Four auditor and 9.018 (£8,250) for a non-
Big Four auditor, if their unobservable character-
istics were ignored. However, as a result of Big
Four auditees’ unobservable characteristics, an
additional 0.660 (Big Four selection effect) is paid
for the services of a Big Four auditor, and 0.755
less for the services of a non-Big Four auditor
(non-Big Four selection effect). The effect of un-
observables is to increase the Big Four fees (in £)
by 93% (e0.660=1.93). These estimates imply that
Big Four auditees choose the cheaper auditor
based on observed information, but the most ex-
pensive when unobservable characteristics are
taken into account. Moreover, there are substan-
tial differences between the MLE and Heckman
estimates, which in itself, is indicative of model
instability.
To assess the potential for parameter instability,
Table 4 also examines the consequences of omit-
ting the exclusion variable (CHTA) from the pro-
bit auditor selection equation. In this instance,
changes in the MLE estimates are relatively
minor, with the premium paid by the Big Four in-
creasing moderately from 0.613 (85%) to 0.624
(87%). The difference in unconditional means
(ATE) in the Heckman model, however, increases
almost fivefold to –1.155 and is now statistically
significant (at p < 0.01), although this is more
than offset by the estimated impact of the unob-
servable selection difference (2.485). Comparing
specifications therefore suggests the Heckman re-
sults are highly sensitive to model specification
using the standard approach, although this is ap-
parently less problematic when estimated using
maximum likelihood.
The R2 reported for both Big Four and non-Big
Four equations in the bottom two rows of Table 4
for both models also testify to the high levels of
multicollinearity when the λ variable is regressed
on the other variables in the audit fee equation. In
Specification 1, these are 0.986 and 0.854 (i.e.
variance inflation factors of 71.4 and 6.8) for the
Big Four and non-Big Four equations respectively,
suggesting that even with an identifying variable
(CHTA) multicollinearity may pose problems for
the Big Four estimation. To summarise the results
from Table 4, the ML estimator appears most effi-
cient whereas the estimates provided by the stan-
dard Heckman two-step procedure (the only
method used for dealing with selection bias in the
auditing literature to date) are potentially seriously
unstable.
In Table 5, we examine the sensitivity of the
Heckman and ML estimates of the selection term
(λ) by changing the samples and variables used to
estimate the selection models; we also report esti-
mates of the premium using a single stage OLS
pooled model for comparison, together with the
associated R2 and sample size (n) for the various
models.
The sample in row 1 is based on all Big Four and
all non-Big Four auditees and is reported for com-
parative purposes. Although it was not our aim to
replicate the Chaney et al. (2004) study, as a fur-
ther robustness test, row 2 reports estimates for the
current sample, using the specification employed
by Chaney et al. in their study of UK private com-
panies (and noting the absence of a valid identify-
ing variable in the selection equation).23 The
Chaney et al. (2004) model estimated in our sam-
ple has a substantially higher explanatory power
(R2 = 0.68 for the pooled model) than reported in
their study (0.57), although this is still substantial-
ly lower than for the model specification (row 1) 
in this study (0.78)24,25. Of more importance, how-
ever, is that the Heckman two-step estimates of the 
λ coefficients (row 2), are both highly significant
(p < 0.001) and positive (1.850) and negative
(–2.378) for the Big Four and non-Big Four mod-
els respectively. Similar findings are also evident
from the MLE results. Hence, in contrast to
Chaney et al. (2004), their models in our sample
156 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
23 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this sug-
gestion. The variables are lnTA, EXPSAL, LOND, BUSY (all
defined as in the current study), the ratio of exceptional and
extraordinary items to total assets (EXTA), long-term debt to
total assets, sales to total assets, the quick ratio, current assets
to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes divided by
total assets (RTA), BUSY  lnTA (BTA) and RTA  a loss in-
dicator variable where unity = a company which made a loss
in the prior period, zero otherwise. All variables were includ-
ed in their audit fee model; but their selection model excluded
BUSY, BTA, LOND and EXTA. There is a small fall in the sam-
ple size as a result of missing observations for the prior peri-
od loss indicator.
24 Similar points also apply to the R2 for separate Big Four
and non-Big Four regressions.
25 The lower explanatory power of the Chaney et al. (2004)
models in their, relative to our, sample may partly relate to 
the larger sample (across all size ranges) employed in the cur-
rent study and/or the rounding imprecision in their data noted
earlier.
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produce the same signs on the λ coefficients for
the Big Four and non-Big Four equations as those
reported for the specifications employed in the
current study (row 1) – although these coefficients
are inconceivably large, being over four times
larger than the respective coefficients of our
Heckman two-step specifications. Furthermore, a
contemporaneous working paper by Francis and
Lennox (2008) reproduces the analysis of Chaney
et al. (2004) using precisely the same variables and
sample design (although for a later time period)
confirms this instability. Inter alia, Francis and
Lennox report an average positive λ coefficient
(0.10) for the Chaney et al. Big Four auditor spec-
ification (as in the current study) and a positive
one (0.21) for the non-Big Four specification.
However, neither of the coefficients was statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels, suggesting
no evidence of significant auditor selection bias.
Finally, we note that using the Chaney et al. (2004)
variables in our samples leads to a much higher
OLS pooled estimate of the Big Four premium
(47%) than that utilising the variables in this study
(31%).
Since our auditee size cut-off point is low rela-
tive to previous studies, in row 3 we report param-
eter estimates for our previously reported models,
but restricting the sample to firms with total assets
exceeding £10,000.26 The significance and signs of
the λ coefficients are relatively stable – particular-
ly the MLE parameters – although the R2 of the
pooled model declines (to 0.76) as does the esti-
mated Big Four premium (to 29%).
In row 4 of Table 5, labelled the ‘thicker support
region’, we exclude extreme observations (below
the 5th and above the 95th percentiles) of the prob-
ability of selecting a Big Four auditor for the
whole sample to provide estimates where there is
more common support between the sub-samples.
Row 5 excludes observations with a probability of
selecting a Big Four auditor below the 5th, and
above the 95th percentile for Big Four auditees
and hence provides estimates where the Big Four
and non-Big Four samples are more closely
matched in terms of their selection probabilities. In
row 4, the Big Four selection effect is now statisti-
cally insignificant for both the Heckman two-step
and MLE parameters. In row 5, it is relatively
large for the Heckman model but insignificant, as
it is for the MLE model. These results underline
the importance of comparable samples but at the
possible cost of increasing multicollinearity. The
non-linearity of the selection term is most notice-
able for firms with high probabilities of selecting a
Big Four auditor, so excluding these firms will
tend to produce samples where a linear equation
provides a more complete summary of the varia-
tion in λ. The converse applies for the non-Big
Four firms and this is consistent with the Heckman
two-step result in row 5, where large numbers of
firms with high probabilities of choosing non-Big
Four auditors are excluded.
In summary, unlike the standard single-stage
pooled regression estimates of the Big Four premi-
um, which Table 5 shows are always highly statis-
tically significant in all models, this sensitivity
analysis indicates that our original two-step results
are not robust across all the sample and variable
changes investigated. The sensitivity of the esti-
mated selection effect to the omission of our 
identifying variable is consistent with extant
econometric studies (above), and is of key impor-
tance to existing and future accounting studies
which do not include a valid instrument when em-
ploying Heckman two-step procedures. The results
in Table 5 also suggest that the positive selection
effects for Big Four auditees may be driven by
large companies and, with less certainty, the nega-
tive ones for non-Big Four auditees by small firms.
There is evidence of serious instability in the coef-
ficients, most noticeably varying by estimation
technique. Nonetheless, the pattern of results gives
no support to the hypothesis that Big Four auditees
are choosing the lowest cost auditor after control-
ling for selection bias.
4.3. Matching results
Because of the sensitivity of the Heckman
model demonstrated above, this section reports
the results of the Big Four premium matching
analysis. Under the conditional independence as-
sumption, this produces estimates of the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) not prone to
the model specification and identification prob-
lems discussed above. We employ two matching
methods: propensity score matching and a pre-
process matching analysis combined with OLS 
regressions.
Propensity score matching
As discussed above, recent developments in the
statistics and econometrics literature have suggest-
ed propensity score matching as an additional or
alternative approach to two-step Heckman proce-
dures. Since the seminal paper of Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983), propensity score matching has re-
ceived considerable attention as a means of esti-
mating causal treatment effects. In our analysis,
Big Four auditees are matched to non-Big Four au-
ditees on the basis of the predicted probability of
employing a Big Four auditor – with the propensi-
ty scores (predicted probabilities) being derived
from the probit selection equation (Model 4, Table
158 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
26 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for suggest-
ing this extension of our analysis. We also conducted this
analysis for firms above and below the median and restricting
the sample to firms with total assets over £1,000,000 and ob-
tained further evidence of instability.
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3), which includes all explanatory variables listed
in Table 1.27 Following matching, the average
audit fees paid by the matched sub-samples are
compared, to assess whether a significant premi-
um is evident.28
The most popular propensity score matching
method is nearest neighbour matching. In our study,
this entails matching each Big Four auditee to the
non-Big Four counterpart with the propensity score
closest in value to that of the Big Four auditee.
Nearest neighbour matching can be implemented
with or without a ‘calliper’, where the  calliper
represents the maximum (absolute) difference be-
tween the propensity score of the nearest neigh-
bour matched observations. A tighter calliper
results in more closely matched observations but
reduces the sample size, i.e. it only selects obser-
vations that can be matched within the minimum
distance imposed by the calliper. When employing
this method, researchers face a choice of whether
to use replacement observations, i.e. permitting the
use of non-Big Four (non-treated) auditees for
matching with their Big Four counterparts more
than once. This can be important in the nearest
neighbour (without calliper) approach, since very
large Big Four clients may have a limited number
of counterparts in the non-Big Four sample; hence,
excluding replacement can result in relatively
large differences in propensity scores between the
matched observations.
We therefore report in Table 6 (Panel A) results
based on four different matching approaches to ex-
amine the robustness of our results and to illustrate
the differences between the various methods,29 each
of which produces an equal number of matched Big
Four and non-Big Four auditees. Panel A of Table 6
shows that the Big Four premium (the difference in
the means of lnAFEE of the Big Four and non-Big
Four sub-samples) is statistically significant at p <
0.01 under each type of matching, ranging from
0.2531 (28.8%) with a calliper of 0.001 (column 4)
to 0.3082 (36.1%) under the nearest neighbour
method with no replacement in column 3.30
Moreover, as the statistics in column 5 demonstrate,
even when Big Four and non-Big Four companies
are very closely matched (with a maximum absolute
difference in propensity scores of only 0.0001), the
premium (0.2613 or 29.9%) remains robust and is
within the range of premiums reported in prior re-
search and in our earlier analysis based on OLS.
Although the results in column 5 demonstrate
that the samples are very closely matched on their
observed characteristics based on the composite
propensity score, it is also important to examine
how closely matched the Big Four auditees are to
their non-Big Four counterparts in respect of the
individual covariates. Panel B of Table 6 reveals
that the two samples are also very similar in respect
of each of the individual characteristics (variables)
in the auditor choice and fee equations (Model 4).
Indeed, whilst there are substantial (and signifi-
cant) differences between the characteristics of the
Big Four and non-Big Four auditees before match-
ing (see Table 2), after matching (using the finest
calliper of 0.0001) the differences in the means be-
come small and are all statistically insignificant.31
Since our sample includes a large number of
smaller auditees (due to our relatively low cut-off of
£1,000 for total assets), we also conducted addition-
al propensity score matching analysis on samples re-
stricted first to companies with total assets (TA) in
excess of £10,000 and second to those with TA over
£1m. Using the 0.0001 calliper, we found that for
the first sample (i.e. where TA > £10,000), the pre-
mium was estimated at 0.2311 (26.0%) and for the
second sample (where TA > £1m) at 0.1753 (19.2%).
Both estimates were statistically significant and
even although the latter is somewhat lower than the
estimated premium for our main sample, it is within
the range reported by Moizer (1997). Furthermore,
using the wider calliper of 0.001 on both these size-
restricted samples and on two separate sub-samples
of firms with TA above and below the median (for
the full sample) yielded very similar results. Finally,
we estimated the models without the instrument
(CHTA) and our findings were unchanged.32
On the basis of matched samples that are very
similar in terms of their observed characteristics,
therefore, we find strong evidence of a Big Four
premium of a similar magnitude to that found in
studies employing OLS. Unlike those provided by
the Heckman approach, these estimates are not
sensitive to model specification and do not impose
assumptions of linearity. Moreover, variation in
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 159
27 The conditional mean independence assumption is that
the choice of regime (Big Four auditee or non-Big Four audi-
tee) is not dependent on the regime once the matching vari-
ables (Z) are taken into account. This means, in practice, that
the values of Z should not depend on the type of regime. We
therefore use all the regressors in the fees equation as match-
ing instruments (Z) and make the reasonable assumption that
all the measured characteristics are pre-determined before the
choice of auditor is made.
28 Leuven and Sianesi (2003) provide details of the propen-
sity score matching module (psmatch2) for use with Stata sta-
tistical software.
29 The analysis in Table 6 is based on differences in the log
audit fees to allow comparison with previous findings. We also
conducted this analysis using untransformed audit fees and
obtained very similar results.
30 The results based on the 0.001 and 0.0001 callipers in
columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 are conducted without replace-
ment, though they are virtually unchanged when we do allow
replacement, with a mean difference in log audit fees between
Big Four and non-Big Four auditees of 0.2566 and 0.2639 for
the 0.001 and 0.0001 callipers respectively (both estimates
were statistically significant).
31 We find similar (unreported) results using the 0.001 cal-
liper, where the only variable approaching statistical signifi-
cance is SQSUBS (difference in means of –0.06; p = 0.066).
32 These additional results are unreported for brevity but are
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6
Propensity score matched results†
Panel A: Alternative propensity score matching estimators
Nearest Nearest Calliper of Calliper of
neighbour neighbour 0.001Ψ 0.0001 
(with replacement) (no replacement) (no replacement) (no replacement)
Mean difference in lnAFEE 0.2642 0.3082 0.2531 0.2613
Big Four premium‡ 30.2% 36.1% 28.8% 29.9%
z-statistic 8.23** 15.58** 12.54** 10.91**
N§ 6076 6076 5586 4814
Mean difference in p-score†† 0.0003 0.2393 0.0001 0.0000
Min. difference in p-score 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max. difference in p-score 0.3960 0.6848 0.0010 0.0001
Panel B: Effects of matching (calliper 0.0001) on covariate and propensity score meansϕ
Variable Big Four Non-Big Four Big Four Non-Big Four
pre-match pre-match post-match post-match
P-SCOREτ 0.2246 0.0700 0.1582 0.1582
lnSAL 15.666 13.385 15.128 15.149
lnTA 15.488 12.860 14.906 14.884
CHTA 5.2616 0.4891 1.3583 1.2821
SQSUBS 1.1714 0.2999 0.7827 0.8236
EXPSAL 0.7871 0.0235 0.0571 0.0553
QUALIF 0.0375 0.0315 0.0420 0.0403
PBAL 0.1208 0.0380 0.0835 0.0827
CONLIAB 0.2749 0.0967 0.2194 0.2231
EXITEM 0.5662 0.3206 0.5131 0.5172
TLTA 0.8433 0.7731 0.7817 0.7493
RTA 0.0087 0.2279 0.0206 0.0218
LOND 0.2094 0.3426 0.2185 0.2019
BUSY 0.5583 0.4399 0.5231 0.5330
Notes
† The probit selection model from which propensity scores (p-scores) are derived is reported in Table 3
(Model 4).
†† p-scores are propensity scores.
‡ Results are based on bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications). The premium is the difference between
the mean lnAFEE for Big Four auditors and the mean lnAFEE for matched Big Four counterparts.
§ Note that each method results in an equal number of matched Big Four and non-Big Four auditees.
Ψ The calliper is the maximum permitted absolute difference in propensity score between matched observations.
** represents statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
ϕ None of the means in Panel B differed significantly after matching.
τ Note that the mean (p) of the predicted probabilities derived from the probit model for the whole sample 
always equals the prior probability of selection into the unity value of the binary dependent variable; in our
case p = 0.083 (the proportion of Big Four auditees in the sample).
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the matching approach (e.g. changing callipers and
allowing replacement observations) indicates that,
unlike the Heckman approach, the results are not
sensitive (in terms of a significant premium) to
changes in samples. It should be emphasised, how-
ever, that the additional robustness, and the fact
that no assumptions are made about functional
form in assessing the premium, come at a cost: any
unobservable differences between Big Four and
non-Big Four clients which systematically influ-
ence both auditor choice and audit fees are effec-
tively assumed to be randomly distributed across
the samples of Big Four and non-Big Four clients.
Pre-processed OLS results
With our pre-processed analysis, using Stata sta-
tistical software, we first partition our sample of
36,674 companies into quantiles on the basis of
their actual size, risk and complexity, as these fac-
tors have been found to be particularly important
determinants of both audit fees and auditor selec-
tion (e.g. see Simunic and Stein, 1996; Chaney 
et al., 2004). We created 40 equally sized quantiles
based on sales (SAL), 40 equally sized quantiles
based on return on total assets (RTA), 10 quantiles
based on the number of subsidiaries (SUBS) and
11 quantiles based on the ratio of exports to sales
(EXPSAL). We then partition the above quantile
samples into companies audited by Big Four and
non-Big Four auditors and matched them, so that
each individual Big Four auditee had an individual
non-Big Four counterpart with concurrent mem-
bership of the same size quantiles for SAL, RTA,
SUBS and EXPSAL. Hence observations are
matched where they exhibit (jointly) similar size,
risk and complexity characteristics. Note that this
pre-processing method can be a more demanding
process than propensity score matching since the
former matches on the basis of actual values for the
four control variables simultaneously, rather than
on one composite score; that is, each Big Four firm
has a non-Big Four counterpart with similar ob-
served size and risk and complexity characteristics.
A dilemma associated with this matching
process is that many Big Four clients have a num-
ber of non-Big Four counterparts of similar size,
risk and complexity. In order to circumvent this
problem, we randomly selected (with replacement)
one match for each Big Four auditee. We then
combined the non-Big Four auditee sample and the
Big Four auditee sample and re-estimated our stan-
dard regression equation (Model 1 in Table 3). We
repeated this process 2,000 times and obtained a
distribution of BIG4 regression coefficients and
their associated robust (White’s corrected) t-statis-
tics (White, 1980). Each iteration involved sam-
ples of 1,828 Big Four auditees and 1,828 matched
non-Big Four auditee counterparts (i.e. a total sam-
ple in each regression of 3,656). Additional analy-
sis (unreported but available on request) showed
that the two (Big Four and non-Big Four) auditee
samples were very closely matched on the four
matching variables with, on average, all differ-
ences being highly statistically insignificant.33
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Table 7
Pre-processed portfolio matched regression results
Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max
BIG4 coefficient 0.2724 0.0114 0.2724 0.2369 0.3091
Big Four premium 31.3% – 31.3% 26.7% 36.2%
BIG4 t-statistic 13.73 0.5652 13.73 11.98 15.51
F-Value 832.58 30.15 833.24 717.57 926.04
Adjusted R2 0.7679 0.0040 0.7679 0.7544 0.7792
Notes
† This table reports the distribution of the BIG4 coefficient estimate from 2,000 iterations, where each iteration
involves a regression (see Model 1 in Table 3) using a total sample of 3,656 companies (i.e. 1,828 Big Four
and 1,828 non-Big Four auditees), together with associated t-statistics and model F and R2. The total sample
of 36,674 companies is first divided on the basis of sales (40 quantiles), exports to sales (11 quantiles), return
on total assets (40 quantiles) and the number of subsidiaries (10 quantiles). Each Big Four auditee is then
matched to a non-Big Four counterpart belonging to the same quantile for each of the four variables. The num-
ber of quantiles for the ratio of exports to sales and number of subsidiaries differs due to a large number of zero
values for each variable. The t-statistic in each iteration uses robust standard errors.
33 For each iteration, we collected the p-value and t-statistic
for mean differences between the Big Four and non-Big Four
samples for the four matching variables and out of the 2,000 it-
erations, there were no significant differences (at p < 0.05) in the
variables on which we matched. More specifically, the range and
mean for the absolute t-statistics, respectively, of the four vari-
ables were 0.31–0.56 and mean of 0.44 for lnSAL; 0.17–1.90
and mean of 1.07 for RTA; 0.18–0.51 and mean of 0.34 for SQ-
SUBS; and 0.02–0.04 with a mean of 0.04 for EXPSAL. We also
repeated this procedure by controlling for both sales and total as-
sets (together with SUBS, EXPSAL and RTA) and obtained sim-
ilar results (though inevitably on a smaller sample).
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Descriptive statistics from the 2,000 regressions
for the BIG4 coefficient and robust t-statistics are
reported in Table 7. The table shows that in every
case, the BIG4 coefficient was statistically signifi-
cant and positive, ranging from 0.2724 (26.7%) to
0.3091 (36.2%), with the mean and median taking
the same value of 0.2724 (31.3%). The distribution
of t-statistics (which are based on White’s correct-
ed standard errors) reveals that the BIG4 coeffi-
cient is consistently significant at p < 0.01. It is
also interesting to note that the range of coeffi-
cients implies a premium between 27% and 36%,
which is broadly in line with that (16–37%) found
in prior literature and of a similar magnitude to our
propensity score estimates. Hence, the Big Four
premium is persistent after matching on key audi-
tee attributes (size, risk and complexity) and con-
trolling for any remaining confounding influences
via OLS regression.
5. Conclusions
Since the seminal paper by Simunic (1980), a large
number of studies have predicted and found that
large auditors have commanded a premium for
their services, possibly due to superior audit quali-
ty, ‘deep pockets’ and other reputational effects.
Important innovations in the literature by (inter
alia) Ireland and Lennox (2002) and Chaney et al.
(2004) challenged findings based on OLS regres-
sions. The latter paper overturned much of the prior
research by stating that, given their firm specific
characteristics, private UK companies that chose a
Big Five auditor would have paid more had they
chosen a non-Big Five auditor, thus leading to the
conclusion that the large auditor premium does not
exist and that the audit market is properly organised
(ibid.: 70). Although this is an economically per-
suasive conclusion, the econometrics literature
suggests that selection effects estimated using the
Heckman procedure may be highly sensitive to
model specification and collinearity; consequently,
standard OLS regression can produce more accu-
rate estimates than their two-stage counterparts
(Hartman, 1991; Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997).
Applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to
OLS regression results, we find that the majority of
the Big Four premium is attributable to large differ-
ences in the characteristics of Big Four and non-Big
Four auditees. Using this approach, we estimate the
Big Four premium at 29–31%, using the estimates
of linear equations for samples with markedly dif-
ferent characteristics. An important question, how-
ever, is whether the premium correctly reflects what
the change in fees would be if auditees changed au-
ditor type. The OB decomposition assumes each au-
ditee can change auditor (unconstrained) to the
other type and pay the corresponding counterfactu-
al fees.34 Our results based on the Heckman correc-
tion (which allows for unobservable differences
between Big Four and non-Big Four auditees) con-
firm prior reports in other areas of social science re-
search that this procedure does not represent a
panacea for estimating selection effects. The stan-
dard Heckman two-step method is highly sensitive
to model specification, collinearity and to sample
composition. The results also appear highly depend-
ent on the estimation technique adopted. A compar-
ison of the standard Heckman two-step and
maximum likelihood estimators revealed large dif-
ferences in the estimate of the selection effect.
Our findings relating to the impact of correctly
identifying the Heckman model with an appropriate
instrument are of key importance, since the difficul-
ty in obtaining such an exclusion variable is often a
major barrier to valid implementation of the method
(see, e.g. Bryson et al., 2002); and ideally, the instru-
ment should not be strongly correlated with the re-
maining selection model regressors. Furthermore,
although we present evidence of a significant selec-
tion effect, this does not support the interpretation of
cost minimisation and does suggest that Big Four au-
ditors receive higher audit fees. The potentially criti-
cal finding of Chaney et al. (2004) that private firms
select the type of auditor that provides the cheapest
service once unobservable auditee characteristics are
taken into account is therefore unsupported by our
analysis of private UK independent firms.
Whilst two-stage estimators allow for potential
unobserved characteristics, our results demonstrate
that the advantages of these methods are unproven,
and should be traded off against their sensitivity.
Three different studies of UK private companies
have produced three different sets of results relat-
ing to the impact of unobservable variables on pre-
miums using the Heckman estimator, but all
reported significant premiums using standard mod-
els. Although it is possible (but unlikely) that unob-
servable factors vary systematically between these
studies, further research seems warranted into the
causes of this variation (e.g. whether unobservables
are non-linear in form, model identification and ex-
planatory variables utilised), and the nature of any
such characteristics.
When we employ a more stable matching ap-
proach to estimate the premium by comparing the
audit fees for Big Four and non-Big Four auditees
of a similar degree of size, risk and complexity, we
find a persistent premium of a magnitude in line
with that found in prior single-stage OLS audit fee
studies. The propensity score matching and pre-
processed matched regression estimates of the Big
162 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
34 We noted in the paper, for example, that this is highly im-
probable in respect of the largest auditees (e.g. FTSE 100
companies), which are de facto constrained to Big Four audi-
tors. Linear extrapolation outside the common support region
in such cases may lead to inaccurate premium estimates; and
here propensity score and pre-processed portfolio matching
approaches may provide more accurate estimates.
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Four premium are around 30%, with such matching
estimators being highly robust to changes in model
specification, and uninfluenced by assumptions of
functional form. Although extant analytical re-
search suggests unobservable factors such as insid-
er knowledge of future cash flows may be
important in determining auditor choice, there is
disagreement on the magnitude and direction of
these effects (cf. Titman and Trueman, 1986; Datar
et al., 1991). Further research is warranted on the
identification and implementation of empirical
proxies for these characteristics (including vari-
ables capturing the presence and efficiency of the
internal audit function and financial information
and control systems), and the inclusion of such
variables in more robust matching analyses. For ex-
ample, Collis et al. (2004) find, using questionnaire
data, that demand for voluntary audit of small com-
panies is related to the perceived improvements in
internal controls and in the quality of information
provided (e.g. to banks). Such methods may pro-
vide insights into differential demand for Big Four
and non-Big Four audits although may themselves
be subject to measurement bias. Taken together
with the findings of previous research that large au-
ditors produce higher quality audits (e.g. Blokdijk
et al., 2006), and with the findings of a contempo-
raneous study by Francis and Lennox (2008), our
results suggest that the Big Four premium persists
and that Heckman-based research that the premium
vanishes once selection is allowed for should be
treated with caution.
Appendix
(i) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
Standard pooled OLS regression using a Big Four dummy indicator variable in a single equation assumes that
all slope coefficients for the Big Four and non-Big Four are identical (i.e.using the notation from equations (1)
and (2) in the text, αk = βk, all k). The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is based on separate regressions for Big
Four and non-Big Four clients and emphasises that the observed actual difference in audit fees can partly be
attributed to the different characteristics of the two types of auditees and partly to any Big Four premium.
Hence, it expresses the difference in the means of audit fees as:
(A1)
(A2)
(ii) Heckman selection model
The Heckman procedure involves estimating the selection term λ by modelling the auditor choice process in
the first step. Here, each company has an unobserved propensity (D*) to choose a Big Four auditor. D* is a lin-
ear function of M regressors (Zm m = 1,.., M) and other unobservable characteristics (εSEL). The model can there-
fore be represented as follows:
Auditor choice equation (A3)
For Big Four auditees (A4)
For non-Big Four auditees (A5)
If D* > 0, D = 1 and we observe lnF = lnFBIG4. Otherwise D* ≤ 0, D = 0 and lnF = lnFNON. The model assumes
that the errors of the selection and fee equations are jointly normal with zero means, constant variances and co-
variances: E(εSELεNON) = σSNON and E(εSELεBIG4) = σSBIG4. The implied correlation between the unobservable fac-
tors determining the choice of auditor type and audit fees, together with the assumption of normality, enable
the estimation of this model.35 The importance of the normality assumption is discussed by Greene (2003: 789) 
35 For instance, companies more likely to employ Big Four auditors (i.e. have ‘large’ εSEL) given their observable character-
istics (Z) are likely to value unobservable aspects of Big Four auditors’ services more highly (i.e. have ‘large’ εBIG4).
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and by van der Klaauw and Koning (2003); with the latter reporting that coefficient estimates do not appear
sensitive to departures from normality. The model may be estimated directly by maximum likelihood but it is
more common to employ the Heckman two-step method. This involves the estimation of an augmented regres-
sion equation with necessary adjustments to the formulae for the standard errors:
For Big Four auditees (A6)
For non-Big Four auditees (A7)
(A8)
where and
and φ is the normal density function and Φ the normal distribution function. Note that the fee equation for non-
Big Four auditees is estimated with selection into non-Big Four (i.e. the dependent variable for the probit is
ND = 1 if the firm is a non-Big Four auditee). The coefficient of the selection term in this estimation is there-
fore the covariance between the error in the selection equation determining whether ND = 1 and εNON, i.e. an
estimate of –σSNON. In the interests of comparability between the two equations, all results in the paper for the
non-Big Four fee equation report estimates of σSNON.
(iii) Matching estimators
Each Big Four auditee can be defined in terms of the values of some observable variables (Z  {Z1,..,ZM}).
Matching uses Z to produce a comparable non-Big Four auditee for each Big Four auditee. Let M be the set of
NM matched pairs of firms. The estimated treatment effect for each matched Big Four auditee is:
D(Zi) = lnFBIG4(Zi) – lnFNON (Zi) i∈M (A9)
The estimated Big Four premium (Δ), or the treatment effect, is the sample mean of these differences across
all values of Z in M or the difference in the sample means. Hence:
(A10)
(A11)
where the subscript M indicates that the mean is for companies in the matched sample.
Matching relies heavily on two assumptions: the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and common
support. The CIA requires the value of audit fees to be independent of auditor type given the values of the ob-
servable variables.36 To illustrate, assume that auditee size is the only determinant of audit fees. Consider a sim-
ple comparison of the mean audit fees paid by all Big Four auditees with those paid by all non-Big Four
auditees, thus treating auditee size as an unobservable variable. This only makes sense if auditee size is not a
determinant of auditor choice. However, if we compare samples of Big Four and non-Big Four auditees with
the same size distribution we can ignore the effect of auditee size. CIA states formally that any unobservable
variation in fees after adjusting for auditee size has the same random distribution for each type of auditee. Such
adjustments are only possible if Big Four and non-Big Four auditees exist of comparable size.
The common support assumption merely states that such comparable auditees exist. For example, if all very
large auditees were only audited by the Big Four, then it would be impossible to find comparable non-Big Four
auditees. If the Big Four premium is regarded as payable by any auditee, matching assumptions imply that au-
ditees are freely able to switch auditor and incur the corresponding counterfactual fees. It is therefore assumed
that any systematic effect of the choice of auditor (D) on audit fees can be entirely explained in terms of some
observable variables (Z). In practice, Z is interpreted as the set of determinants of the auditor choice decision.
Consider the following semi-parametric matching model (with the selection equation repeated for reference):
36 More formally: lnFBIG4, lnFNON⊥ D | Z
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